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applied at any stage in the design, planning and implementation of those projects, was especially worrisome. The Sub-Commission should bring those institutions under its scrutiny and hold them accountable for violations of human rights. It should take serious note of the recommendations to that effect contained in the final report by Mr. Danilo Türk on the realization of economic, social and cultural rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16). There was still time to influence the World Bank, which would take its final decision on 1 September 1992 on whether to continue financing the project in the light of the Morse Review. The principles laid down in the Morse Review should also be extended to all future projects supported by the World Bank. She therefore urged the Sub-Commission to make its opposition to the project known.

72. Mr. PEREIRA GOMES (Observer for Portugal) reminded experts that at its previous session the Sub-Commission had decided not to consider a draft resolution on East Timor, in the light of certain positive developments, such as the agreement in principle that a Portuguese parliamentary delegation should visit the territory on a fact-finding mission, and the invitation extended to the Special Rapporteur on torture of the Commission on Human Rights to visit the territory. In the meantime, however, further tragic events had cast new light on the whole situation in East Timor; the visit by the parliamentary delegation had been suspended; and the report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1992/17/Add.1) left no doubt as to the extent of the repression and human rights violations, including systematic torture, taking place there.

73. The events that had begun in Motael at the end of October 1991 and had culminated on 12 November with the massacre of civilians by the Indonesian authorities in the Santa Cruz cemetary at Dili were largely the result of the climate of repression and intimidation established by Indonesia in the run-up to the visit by the Portuguese parliamentary delegation. The first reactions of the highest military authorities after the massacre had illustrated both the illegality of the power wielded by Indonesia in East Timor, and also its brutal and repressive nature. General Try Sutrisno, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had described the demonstrators as criminals who must be liquidated. However, confronted with an unexpected and unprecedented international reaction, the Indonesian authorities had realized that they could not simply continue to describe the facts as calumnies and exaggerations. Consequently, they had changed tactics, expressing regret at the deaths and promising that an inquiry would be held into the massacre. In the light of alarming precedents, however, his delegation had been convinced that the inquiry and supplementary measures proposed by the Indonesian authorities, who were in any case an illegal occupying force, would lack credibility and impartiality. Only an internationally monitored inquiry could fully explain the circumstances of the massacre. That conviction had been borne out by subsequent events, with the authorities claiming that it was not the army but the peaceful demonstrators who, by their aggressive and provocative attitude, had been responsible for the massacre.

74. That lack of credibility and good faith had been confirmed by the behaviour of the Indonesian authorities as a member of the Commission on Human Rights. On 4 March 1992, the Chairman of the Commission had read out a Consensus Declaration on the human rights situation in East Timor. By subscribing to that Declaration, Indonesia had been politically, morally and

legally bound to take certain measures and observe certain standards. An analysis of its subsequent actions showed, however, that Indonesia had accepted the consensus simply in order to reduce international pressure, and that it had no intention of taking the steps to which it had committed itself when acknowledging the seriousness of the human rights situation in East Timor and deploring the violence perpetrated by its own Armed Forces in Dili on 12 November 1991 - steps which included a continuation of the inquiry into the actions of its security forces, with a view to resolving inconsistencies regarding the fate of missing persons and the exact number of dead.

75. Official expressions of regret regarding the Santa Cruz incident were at odds with recent statements by the military authorities. General Syafei had recently told journalists that, had he been in command in East Timor at the time of the incident, the number of dead and injured would probably have been higher. In a recent interview in the Indonesian magazine Editor, General Mantiri had said that he had no regrets, describing the demonstrators as anti-Government rebels and warning of similiar reactions should the demonstrations continue. Regarding the fate of the persons still missing, General Syafei had said that it would be better if they were already dead.

76. In the Commission on Human Rights, the Indonesian Government had accepted the need for all members of the Armed Forces responsible for the massacre to be tried and punished, and had undertaken to ensure that all civilians arrested on that occasion were treated humanely, that those brought to trial received proper legal representation and a fair trial, and that those not involved in the violence should be freed without delay. In point of fact, however, the survivors of the slaughter had been accused of non-violent activities and sentenced to harsh terms of imprisonment under the Anti-Subversion Law, the abolition of which had been called for by the Special Rapporteur on Torture in his recommendations, which had been accepted by Indonesia. According to Amnesty International, the survivors had been sentenced for non-violent political and human rights activities and the exercise of freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. None of the indictments it had seen contained any specific reference to the use or advocacy of violence. Furthermore, those junior and reserve officers brought before a military court had received sentences of between 8 and 18 months' imprisonment for breaches of discipline, and not for perpetrating a massacre.

77. The Indonesian Government had also undertaken to facilitate access to the territory by other humanitarian and human rights organizations that had hitherto been denied any access. That undertaking had not been honoured. On the contrary, since March 1992, foreign journalists, Indonesian correspondants for the foreign media and tourists had been forbidden to enter the territory. Those indications of a return to the old policy of cutting off the territory from the outside world did not augur well for the future. Must the international community wait for further massacres, filmed or observed by independent witnesses, before it finally realized the full extent of the shocking and systematic violations of human rights in East Timor?

78. Mr. Alfonso Martínez took the Chair.